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Introduction 
The law of less work (Hull, 1943) is our natural tendency 
given two alternatives with equal incentives to pick the less 
demanding one. This notion also appears in the field of 
judgment and decision making (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), it is referred to as 
internal cost of effort. Cognitive parsimony is our tendency 
to favour low-effort strategies that help us to decide faster 
and simple strategies to approach a complex problem. An 
experimental paradigm for this phenomenon has been 
developed by Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick (2010) 
and referred to as the demand selection task. In this poster, 
we present a model of this task developed in the ACT-R 
architecture (Anderson, 2007), which offers an hypothesis 
as to which cognitive mechanisms might participate in this 
phenomenon.  
Demand Selection Task  
In the demand selection task (Kool et al., 2010), two 
decks of cards are placed symmetrically left and right of the 
center of the screen. The keyboard is used to select one of 
the decks and uncover the card upon which a digit, between 
1 and 9, will be displayed. According to the color of the 
number, the subject has to perform a different type of 
judgement. Blue calls for a magnitude judgment: if the 
number is less than five, subjects should say yes, otherwise 
no. Yellow calls for a parity judgment: if the number is 
even, subjects should say yes, otherwise, no. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, one deck leads to a low demand task and 
the other deck to a high demand task. Participants are 
instructed to ‘Feel free to move from one deck to the other 
whenever you choose’ and ‘if one deck begins to seem 
preferable, feel free to chose that deck the more often’. In 
the low demand task, the color of each numeral matches the 
previous color on 90% of trials, whereas in the high demand 
task, the color of each numeral matches the previous color 
on 10% of trials. Overall, response times (RT) and error 
rates showed that task switching was cognitively costly, and 
that subjects mostly choose to pick the less cognitively 
demanding deck. While some subjects demonstrated their 
awareness of this effect, the effect did not depend on their 
awareness of it, thus making the DST an interesting task to 
evaluate implicit behaviour. 
Experimental procedure 
We reproduced Experiment 1 from Kool et al’s paper 
(2010). The simulation included 50 runs of 500 trials of the 
Demand Selection Task (DST). The task was self-paced 
with a maximum limit of time of 1h (which was never 
reached by the model or the participants). Subjects had to 
pick between two decks, by pressing a key (“F” for left, “J” 
for right). According to the color of the number (yellow or 
blue), participants had to either produce a parity judgment 
(even or odd) or a magnitude judgment (less or greater than 
five) on the number. Depending on the deck selected, the 
color of the number switched with a probability of 0.9 
(making it a higher demand task) or 0.1 (making it a lower 
demand task) at each trial.  
Model 
The model1 was built in the computational cognitive 
architecture and theory of human cognition ACT-R 
(Adaptive Control of Thought - Rational) (Anderson, 1990; 
2007). In ACT-R, different modules, including two memory 
modules (procedural and declarative) interact to complete a 
cognitive task. The modules are accessed via their 
associated buffers. ACT-R has been used to model several 
tasks. Declarative memory stores facts about the 
environment (know what). The procedural memory, through 
procedural rules (know how), allows for action selection. 
ACT-R is a hybrid cognitive architecture composed of 
symbolic and subsymbolic components: the retrieval of a 
fact (symbol) from declarative memory depends on 
subsymbolic retrieval equations (pondering the context and 
history of retrieval of the fact), and, the selection of a rule 
(symbol) depends on utility subsymbolic equations (which 
computes costs and benefits associated to the rule). The 
memory elements (chunks) are reinforced through patterns 
of occurrence within the environment.  Learning processes 
act at both subsymbolic and symbolic levels.  
The preference of a deck over another one relies on implicit 
mechanisms: mainly base-level and spreading activation 
with the participation of utility learning. Base-level learning 
                                                            
1 Model code available at: http://psych-
scholar.wright.edu/astecca/software 
In D. Reitter & F. E. Ritter (Eds.), Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Cognitive Modeling 
(ICCM 2016). University Park, PA: Penn State.
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determines how patterns of use affect chunk activation and 
decay. Spreading activation provides context to the retrieval 
since chunks will spread an amount of activation to other 
chunks in declarative memory, based on the relationship 
they have with other chunks. The choice between the two 
decks is represented by two procedures. After the model 
picks one deck, it perceives a number and a color, and then 
it retrieves the chunks associated to the color and the 
number. Chunks of the yellow color are associated with a 
‘parity’ chunk, chunks of the ‘blue’ color are associated 
with a ‘magnitude’ chunk. The retrieved chunk is placed in 
the imaginal module. A judgement is produced based on the 
retrieved chunk, and an answer is vocalized. The chunk 
placed in the imaginal buffer will spread activation and 
influence the next retrieval request. A reward is back 
propagated after the answer has been produced. The failure 
to retrieve a judgment chunk will lead to errors which are 
also signaled to the model by backpropagation.  
 
Figure 1: Mean RT by options. 
 
Therefore, the gradual selection of the lower demanding 
deck occurs through two mechanisms: the retrieval of 
elements in the higher demanding deck (with high 
probability of switch) will take longer (representing the 
expended effort required) as activation from the previous 
trial will have spread less to the current trial. And, the 
longer this process takes, the less reward gets back-
propagated to the selection of this deck (as the reward gets 
discounted with time). Thus, gradually, the selection of the 
less demanding deck is the one that is going to be reinforced 
the most. Errors encountered will be due to the failure of 
retrieval of judgment chunks.  
Results 
As in the original experiment, we measured the verbal RT 
for the two decks (low demand vs. high demand) and trial 
types (task switch vs. task repetition). Figure 1 shows the 
means of medians for each trial types and deck types.   
Table 1 shows the parameters used in the ACT-R model. An 
ANOVA indicated as in the original experiment significant 
effects for trial types (F (1,50) = 9.940; p < 0.002) and deck 
types (F (1,50) = 3.691; p < 0.05). Average selection of the 
lower demanding task is 63% in our experiment (68% in the 
original experiment). 
 
Table 1: Model parameters. 
Parameters Value 
:rt  -1.0 
:alpha 0.1 
:lf 1.5   
:mas 3.0 
:imaginal-activation 0.41 
:ans 0.1 
:bll 0.21 
Discussion and conclusion 
The demand selection task is aimed at evaluating the 
tendency to avoid cognitively demanding tasks. 
Computational cognitive models have been made of  
“minimal control” (Taatgen, 2007) and “least effort” 
(Anderson, 1990), but this is to our knowledge the first 
model of the DST. We were able to reproduce the results of 
Experiment 1 of Kool et al.’s paper (2010) with a simple 
ACT-R model. The performance at the DST in our 
explanation relies mainly on implicit mechanisms (utility 
learning and base-level and spreading activation), in 
accordance with experimental results showing that the 
participants did not need to be aware of the type of task (low 
demanding or high demanding) for the effect to be 
observed. The DST is interesting to correlate subjects’ 
individual differences with their performance at different 
cognitive tasks. Having a model of such a task will allow us 
in future work to model individual differences as captured in 
the DST model and as they transfer into other tasks and 
might affect performance there (e.g. we are currently using 
this task in an ongoing research studying the relationship 
between cognitive parsimony and vulnerability to 
exploitation in interpersonal transactions).  
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